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What is the key outcome from the negotiations that would best secure the 
sustainability of fisheries? 
 
➢ It is essential to reach an agreement on quota-allocation and access to waters 
which allows all the coastal states to proceed with fully cooperative 
management of their shared fish resources. 
 
There is a general perception that the Common Fisheries Policy has led to large scale 
declines in fish stocks due to over-exploitation. However, this is incorrect. Our analysis 
of over 100 years of data from European fisheries [1] shows that the damage to fish 
stocks occurred between the end of World War II and around 1970. During this period 
there were few effective measures to regulate international fisheries and most 
governments subsidised fleet expansion. A  very large escalation of catching occurred 
that lead inexorably to stock depletion. By the 1980s, it became impossible to sustain 
the level of catches. This failure of management was  inherited by the CFP at its 
formation in 1983. It took many years to rein in the levels of fishing activity during the 
1980’s and 1990’s requiring difficult contractions of the industry and reduction in 
exploitation through effort controls and catch limits, based on extensive scientific 
assessments [2].  Finally, by the early 2010s, the evidence shows that most stocks, at 
least in northern European waters, are meeting internationally recognised 
sustainability criteria [2,3]. A key element of the CFP is that for the first time in Europe 
it provided legally enforceable regulations with sanctions which ultimately proved 
instrumental in reducing over-exploitation. Any new agreement must include 
comparable instruments. 
 
In general, the UK does not dispute the overall level of Total Allowable Catches (TAC) 
for shared stocks, upon which the annual catching opportunities within the CFP are 
based. The annual TAC for each species is based on consensus scientific advice from 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). However, the UK now 
disagrees with the way in which the TACs are shared between member states. The 
current formula for this ‘quota-sharing’ is referred to as Relative Stability, and was 
based largely on historical landings during a period prior to formation of the CFP. 
However, due to changing markets, fleets and distributions of fish, this has led to 
restricted opportunities for UK vessels to exploit stocks in UK waters. This in turn has 
led to excessive discarding of some species such as hake and saithe as vessels are 
forced to remain within catch limits for each individual species in mixed fisheries. 
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Relative Stability, while providing a basis for sharing in the past, has clearly outlived 
its utility. 
 
The draft Fisheries Framework Agreement released by the UK Government on 19 May 
[4]  concentrates on the issues of mutual access to national waters for fishing and re-
alignment of Relative Stability, but makes relatively little reference to the imperative to 
ensure the sustainability of fish stocks.  
 
The problem is that Articles 2 and 4 of the draft imply that the UK will not cooperate 
on the sustainable management of fish stocks unless its demand for a readjustment 
of quota-sharing is met. Article 2 leaves the UK with the option to set-aside the 
independent scientific advice from ICES in favour of “socio-economic aspects and 
other relevant factors”. Article 4 allows for the UK to manage its own fisheries 
independently according to its own perception of sustainability criteria. 
 
Given the current positions of the Parties, an agreement which enables constructive 
cooperation to ensure sustainability of stocks will require both sides to compromise. 
On the one hand, the UK will need to relax its demand for, apparently, a step-change 
in quota-share arrangements from Relative Stability to new allocations reflecting zonal 
attachment. This would be cripplingly difficult for some other member states to absorb. 
On the other hand, the EU will need to recognise that Relative Stability is no longer an 
equitable and productive mechanism for quota-sharing. Both sides need to agree on 
an incremental migration from Relative Stability to a new quota sharing arrangement 
which better reflects the distribution of fish between UK and EU EEZs. Without such 
an agreement, the UKs Draft Framework Agreement clearly threatens unilateral 
actions on fisheries management. Our research [1,5] shows that this would pose a 
threat to the sustainability of fish stocks. 
 
What would be the impact of no agreement on fisheries between the UK and the 
EU? 
 
➢ Our view on this question is restricted to the consequences for the long term 
viability of the fish stocks and their associated ecosystems. – Failure to agree 
would open the way to unilateral action on both sides which our research in the 
North Sea shows would threaten both elements.  
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires coastal 
states to cooperate in the management of shared fish stocks. However, it does not 
prevent states from unilaterally setting catch limits in their own EEZ if no agreement is 
reached - provided these are consistent with ensuring that stocks as a whole are 
protected from overexploitation.  
 
The UK  no longer accepts the share of resources assigned by the EU. If the UK were 
to set catch limits within its waters based on ‘zonal attachment’ [6,7] and exclude EU 
vessels from fishing there, while the EU states maintain their right to catch their 
existing Relative Stability share but from their own waters, then  stocks would face 
being over exploited. There is a clear precedent for this in disputes between states 
involved in the North East Atlantic mackerel and blue whiting fisheries. It is argued that 
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the UK has the upper hand in the negotiations because EU states would not be able 
to catch their Relative Stability quota-share without access to UK waters. However, 
our research suggests that this is not necessarily the case, though it is clear that the 
profitability of doing so would be lower [1]. 
 
We have conducted an assessment of plausible narratives for unilateral quota-setting 
in the North Sea by the EU and Norway on the one hand, and the UK on the other, 
based on provisional zonal attachment estimates for each of the shared fish stocks 
[1,5]. The narratives indicate a 4-fold increase in UK expectations for North Sea 
herring catch, 3-fold for saithe and sole, and smaller expectations for other species. 
These translate into a 70% increase in overall international herring catch over and 
above the recommended TAC, and a 60% increase in pelagic trawling activity. 
Corresponding increases in international catches of demersal fish (cod, haddock, 
whiting) and demersal trawling activity of up to 10% are anticipated. 
 
Two completely different mathematical models were used to simulate the 
consequences of the narratives for fish stocks and the marine food web. The first 
calculated the probability of spawning stock biomass for seven key stocks (herring, 
cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice, sole) falling below the precautionary reference 
level (referred to as ‘Bpa’) following the onset of unilateralism (Fig. 1). Stock biomass 
falling below Bpa is a warning signal which triggers the ICES to recommend reductions 
in fishing in order to conserve the stock. 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage probabilities of spawning stock biomass (SSB) of key 
species in the North Sea falling below their respective precautionary levels of 
biomass (Bpa). Blue bars indicate the probabilities assuming that status quo fishing 
conditions in 2017 continue unchanged into to the future. Red bars indicate the 
probabilities under the unilateralism scenario. 
 
The second model simulated the whole food web in the North Sea, from bacteria to 
whales, but as aggregated groups of similar types of microbes, plants and animals 
rather than as individual species. 
 
The two modelling approaches produced convergent conclusions on the likely risks 
associated with unilateralism. They both showed that the greatest risk is to stocks of 
plankton-eating “pelagic” fish, especially herring. Risks to demersal fish as a whole 
are smaller, but within this group there is a significant risk to cod stocks. Among the 
indirect consequences of unilateralism are declines in cetaceans (whales, dolphins 
and porpoises) and seabirds as a combined consequence of reductions in their main 
food supply (pelagic fish) and increased mortality due to by-catch in fishing gears. 
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What is your view on the usefulness of zonal attachment as a principle for 
dividing fishing opportunities, especially for Scottish fisheries? 
 
➢ Relative Stability provided an agreed framework to share resources but has 
outlived its usefulness. Zonal attachment is a rational alternative for sharing of 
TACs between fishing nations but still requires an agreed interpretation by both 
parties. 
 
There are two aspects to the case for zonal attachment [6,7] as opposed to Relative 
Stability – equity and conservation. The equity case arises from the open-access 
principle at the heart of the CFP. This is that vessels from member states are free to 
fish anywhere in EU waters provided they have a legal quota for the stock and respect 
limitations defined by distance from the coast. In some cases this has led to large 
proportions of the international catch being taken from one member states’ waters. 
Key examples are sandeel and herring in the North Sea where the majority is taken 
from UK waters [1,5,6,7], and mackerel and blue whiting in the NE Atlantic. The equity 
issue arises because for all these species the UK has a much smaller proportion of 
the TAC under Relative Stability than the proportion of total catch taken in the UK EEZ, 
or the proportion of stock in the UK EEZ or, for the migratory species, the proportion 
of time that fish spend in the UK EEZ. As the UK leaves the EU this becomes an acute 
issue of equity. 
 
The conservation issue arises in mixed species fisheries, such as operate in NW 
Europe, because the inflexibility of Relative Stability means that changes in fish 
distribution and species composition, e.g. due to climate change or stock recovery, 
lead to mis-matches between catch composition and quota composition for individual 
fleets. This creates a situation whereby vessels are frequently faced with over-quota 
catches of some species and within-quota catches of others, forcing them to discard 
the so-called ‘choke species’ for which their quota is exhausted. Examples are hake 
in the North Sea and west of Scotland [8]. 
 
The concept of zonal attachment offers solutions to these equity and conservation 
problems, but there is no universally agreed definition of how to estimate it. We 
recently published a scientific article [7] with a considered mathematical definition and 
applied it to several key stocks of interest to Scotland.  Given adequate empirical data, 
this accounts for the potential for different life stages to occur in different areas, and 
for migrating fish. To our knowledge, this is the only scientifically peer reviewed 
definition of zonal attachment based on, and applied to, empirical data.  There is 
nonetheless, likely to be a protracted negotiation over a mutually acceptable definition. 
Also the frequency with which quota-shares should be re-aligned in accordance with 
shifting zonal attachment is controversial, since estimation of zonal attachment from 
survey data carries error and uncertainty so some form of average estimate over time 
would be appropriate. We suggested [7] a five-year time period in keeping with 
periodic reviews of fishery management plans in the EU.  We also suggested, as was 
the case when the concept was introduced between the USA and Canada, that a 
gradual transition could take place, whereby quota-shares migrate towards zonal 
attachment in 10% increments over several years.  It would also be sensible to 
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prioritise the “choke species” such as hake.  This should be politically more justifiable 
considering the fact that certain member states did not even take their quota: in 2018 
for example, Spain was allocated 31,499 t of Northern hake quota, but only caught 
26,078 t; France was allocated 58,274 t and caught 41,260 t; yet the UK, which was 
only allocated 1% of the hake TAC in the North Sea, regularly discards thousands of 
tonnes of hake [8]. 
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